Crux Strategies.com and Media Inc.

Polarization and the Internet

P.J. Worsfold, 8/14/2007

Contents

Today's media landscape is what Prior refers to as a high choice environment (Prior 577). While the advent of cable television in the 1970s begat the high choice era, the tremendous growth of the internet over the last decade has increased society's media choice exponentially. Posner observes, "the public's consumption of news and opinion used to be like sucking on a straw; now it's like being sprayed by a fire hose" (Posner). In an effort to stay competitive in today's high choice environment, many media outlets have turned their attentions towards niche markets. Consequently, a considerable portion of audience attention has shifted away from "general interest intermediaries, including newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters," (Sunstein 2001) to more specialized sources. The internet is already a ubiquitous part of modern life, and yet as it continues to grow and advance, it will play an increasingly vital role as both the host and the mediator of this specialized media environment.

Most agree that the internet's contribution to society remains overwhelmingly positive. However, there is a danger that in a web dominated media landscape, which caters to practically any viewpoint, individuals with similar outlooks will tend to cluster together, "reinforcing each other's similarities" and "standing against people" of differing perspectives (Shedletsky and Aitken 97). Critics fear that as we continue to move from being browsers of generalized media, to being selectors of highly specific media streams, a social polarization will occur, where individuals will retreat from the public sphere and immerse themselves in web-based ideological enclaves. With a specific focus on the web's role as a polarizing force, the remainder of this paper will explore the matter of polarization in more detail. It must first be understood that social polarization is far too complicated a phenomenon to be blamed solely on the evils of commercialized media. With this in mind, I will begin by discussing audience characteristics that can lead towards, or enable social polarization. I will next touch on the media's role in affecting social polarization, before examining the dangers that such polarization poses. Finally, I will conclude this paper with a discussion on what web usage patterns suggest about the web's contribution to an ideologically polarized society.

Polarization and the Audience

Polarization is a two-step process that is comprised of an individual and a group component. Although our web-browsing activities exacerbate matters, the conditions for media-fueled social polarization existed well before the public's widespread adoption of the internet. Social scientists have long observed a predilection amongst audiences to use available information to build and sustain biased and potentially polarizing thoughts and values.

Taking the individual's perspective, Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, which was published in 1957, contends that, "we tend to hear and seek information that is consistent with our beliefs [and that we] tend to avoid or refuse to believe information that is inconsistent with our beliefs" (ibid 97). In other words, Festinger suggests that individuals are more likely to perpetuate their personal biases than challenge their core beliefs.

Considered in terms of media consumption, the implications of Festinger's theory are rather unsettling. Although we may like to think that we read a newspaper or visit a blog to gain a well-balanced view on a particular issue, Festinger's theory holds that in fact, we do so in an effort to reaffirm our existing beliefs and to keep our value system unchallenged. Posner supports the theory of cognitive dissonance and argues that individuals read the news not to fulfill a "thirst for knowledge", but rather to "be confirmed in their beliefs by seeing them echoed and elaborated by more articulate, authoritative and prestigious voices" (Posner).

Today, the shear volume of information that we are exposed to and the technology that we use to navigate through it have a compounding effect on Festinger's theory; galvanizing our resolve to track down value affirming opinions and filter out that which exists past our sphere of concern. We have long used techniques such as headline skimming and channel surfing to scan traditional media for relevant information. However, as Festinger would likely agree, as a means to preserve previously held beliefs, these techniques are inefficient. This is because, while using these methods, we perform the scanning process ourselves and thus we cannot help but be exposed to information that counters our previously held beliefs.

Online, we are able to protect our core beliefs and indulge our biases as never before. The web provides numerous tools that automate the information filtering and delivery process, examples of which include RSS readers and Usenet filters; customizable homepages such as those offered by Microsoft and Google; the suggestion tools on sites like Amazon or Netflix; and social bookmarking tools such as those offered by del.icio.us and Digg. If used in a certain manner, these tools can keep our exposure to dissonant information to a minimum. With a few simple choices, we can create what Negroponte refers to as the "Daily Me" (Sunstein 2001), a web-based stream of information that adheres to our exact preferences and keeps us in-touch with reality, at least as we see it.

Whether our individual media gathering activities contribute to polarizing biases or well-informed balance is ultimately in our own hands. Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson rightly point out that "technology serves mainly to amplify individual preferences" (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 3). However, while the majority of us would like to think that we strive to achieve balanced outlooks, the arguments posed by Festinger and Posner suggest that this may not be true. Moreover, they remind us that before we criticize the media and the technology that enables it, we would be wise to ask ourselves if we are only being given what we have asked for.

Working in a vein similar to Festinger's, Thomas Schelling's 1971 article, Dynamics Models of Segregation assesses how individual choices affect communities. Schelling's model hinges on the assumption that "people naturally enjoy living among others with similar tastes, backgrounds, and values" (Buchanan). To explain his model, Schelling offered a simple demonstration. On a piece of paper, Schelling drew a grid. Within this grid, he randomly placed an equal number of white and black markers, which were intended to depict an integrated society. Assuming it was reasonable to imagine that individuals represented by his black and white markers would not like being in the extreme minority in a particular neighbourhood, Schelling set about rearranging his markers so that at least 30% of each marker's neighbouring markers were of the same colour. Upon completing this process, Schelling observed that not only were his markers no longer integrated, they were placed in "entirely distinct enclaves" (ibid).

Schelling's model illustrates how the "slight preference of the individual to avoid an extreme minority has the paradoxical but inexorable effect of obliterating mixed communities altogether" (ibid). Schelling intended his model to describe racial relations. However, his theory demonstrates how biases of any sort can be "magnified through a kind of network effect" (Carr) and how our tendency to gravitate towards those of similar views can have a profoundly divisive social impact.

As with the theory of cognitive dissonance, the web acts as a powerful catalyst to Schelling's model. In the physical world, time and space as well as matters of personal priority mitigate the effects of Schelling's theory. However, on the web, defining a community is as simple as clicking on a link, subscribing to a blog feed, or adding a friend to a social network (ibid). Moreover, online, we can network from the comfort of our own home. While under the protective veil of pseudonyms, we are free to converse on any manner of topics. Compared to life in the physical world, when applied to the internet, Schelling's segregation effect would "tend to happen much faster - and with even more extreme consequences" (ibid).

If the actions we take online are ultimately expressions of our values, beliefs, and biases, the networked nature of the internet makes it likely that our online activities will put us in touch with likeminded groups. Once we encounter kindred spirits, Schelling's model suggests that we will want to stay in their ideological realm. Moreover, as this networking process occurs, our commonalities with group members will likely become more pronounced. Sunstein notes that upon discussing a topic within a likeminded group, individuals are apt to "move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which they were previously inclined" (Sunstein 2001).

It is at the point where ideological connections are established that individual biases and group dynamics coalesce and the phenomenon of polarization emerges. Much like one's consumption of the "Daily Me', participation in online communities can have numerous benefits if done in moderation and in conjunction with other information gathering endevours. However, if such online activities are focused around ideological extremes, the web serves not only to link likeminded people, it can help them develop, strengthen, and rationalize inaccurate and perhaps dangerous opinions and values.

Polarization and the Media

Assessing the mass media's role as a polarizing agent is a difficult task, particularly when one considers the internet's effect. I began this paper with the observation that the media's move to service niche markets was driven by economics. This perspective holds that in an era of less competition, in order to maximize audiences and therefore advertising revenue, media outlets of the 1950s and 1960s tended to offer generalized content and a more subtle political perspective. Thus, audiences followed the same social agenda and were aware of the same broad issues. Conversely, and with growing frequency since the 1970s, in an effort to carve out market share and draw audience attention in a competitive landscape, media outlets have moved to more politically extreme positions and have increased the presence of salacious and violent content in their offerings. Consequently, audiences have gravitated toward a particular media outlet's narrow view and have retreated from the public sphere to indulge personal interests (Posner).

The web is the apotheosis of media choice as well as a highly commercialized environment. It is therefore logical to assume that it will only add to the legacy of social polarization left to it by the traditional mass media. However, one of the internet's defining characteristics is its capacity to let average people express and exchange ideas and opinions on a massive scale. Today, anyone with rudimentary computer skills and an internet connection can communicate to an audience that could potentially be measured in the millions.

Certainly, the process of ideological exchange is not without its commercial element. So called A-list bloggers have transitioned their celebrity status into tidy profits and traditional media outlets all have substantial online presences. However, most of those operating websites, publishing blogs, and participating in discussion forums are doing so on an amateur, non-profit, or small-scale commercial level. Such operations are free from the advertising pressures and complex hierarchies that hobble large organizations. Subsequently, one could conclude that for better or worse, most of the opinions offered online are those of their respective authors and are less likely to be efforts to attract audiences. Nonetheless, there is a preponderance of extreme opinion on the internet, suggesting that not only do individuals tend to consume biased opinions, they tend to express them as well. This raises many interesting points and calls into question the notion that the media's commercial nature is creating a polarized society.

The Dangers of Polarization

Today's society is one of decentralization; the internet itself was designed with this very principle in mind. While keeping us connected through an array of fiber optics and satellites, technology allows us to work, learn, and socialize without having to share the same physical space. Brown and Duguid note that today, "supported by the 'Net, people can drift apart [to] home offices and telecentres" (Brown and Duguid 65). This decentralization has many benefits; however, it is my contention that is also fosters a sense of isolation. While the internet, like all mass media, can and does work to remind individuals of their commonality, as we have discussed, it can also support intense social division.

Media analysts warn that the polarization, which typically accompanies such division, has many dangers. Perhaps the most commonly cited issue is that highly polarized online communities are ripe for the spread of misinformation. Within ideologically extreme communities, whose members value unquestioning dedication over informed debate, a well-placed falsehood or skewed statistic can be spread quickly and soon become an accepted 'fact'. Sunstein has observed such phenomena within numerous online hate-groups (Sunstein 2003 109).

The dangers of misinformation being spread online are very real, however, I believe that overall, such concerns are overstated. A greater risk posed by social polarization is the likelihood that it will be accompanied by a process of individual secession from the public sphere. Lasch supports this concern commenting, "in the age of information the American people are notoriously ill informed" (Lasch 11). Aside from the obvious dangers of an ignorant public in an era of global trade and global warming, simple matters of group cohesion are at risk in a polarized society. For instance, if individuals only experience social interactions within their ideological communities, they will likely find it difficult to relate to, and compromise with others outside of their social stratum. Sunstein cautions, that within a polarized society, "mutual understanding might be difficult, and it might be hard for people to solve problems that society faces together" (Sunstein 2001).

The Web's Contribution

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of empirical evidence relating to the existence of ideological bias amongst web users' viewing preferences and online communications. Where research exists, conclusions are often contradictory and thus, it is difficult to assess the web's contribution to social polarization. However, the theory of cognitive dissonance clearly suggests that some level of bias must exist. This conclusion is supported by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, which noted that web users commonly use the internet to "find and join groups that share their ideological, cultural, and lifestyle preferences" (Cornfield and Rainie). On the other hand, the same group found that "during the 2004 [presidential election] campaign, internet users were more likely to be aware of differing political views --including those that counter their own beliefs -- than non-users" (ibid).

Offering a different perspective of the internet during the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Adamic and Glance's paper, The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election: Divided They Blog suggests that online political communities are indeed very skewed and thus serve as contributors to broad social polarization. In their study, Adamic and Glance analyzed the linking patterns and degree of interaction between 1494 of the web's most popular blogs on American politics; 759 of these blogs were of a liberal bent, while 735 were conservative. Among several interesting findings, Adamic and Glance observed that "91% of the links originating within either the conservative or liberal communities [stayed] within that community" (Adamic and Glance 4). Their work suggests that once a user enters a web-based political community, the likelihood of them encountering an idea contrary to that of the status-quo is slim.

Conclusion

After decades of mainstream media bias, the internet has placed each of us in charge of our own personal news and information gathering process. Yet it seems that, as individuals, we may be susceptible to some of the same shortcomings that make us so critical of traditional media aggregators. Our media consumption patterns of the past ought to make us question our own objectivity and make us wonder if, in the future, we can rely on web savvy and judgment to seek out a balance of information that fulfills both personal interests and social obligations. This is certainly no time to retreat from the public sphere. In this global era, it behooves each of us to endeavour to understand and appreciate our shared concerns and our differing perspectives. When combined with human effort, the web can facilitate this process of understanding, yet without user initiative, it seems that for some, the web will only deepen existing social divides. As a society, it is vital that we do not forget the value of shared experience and of an agreed upon public agenda. It would be a sad irony if a technology based around networked communications ultimately helped create social division.

Works Cited

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